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The charge of resisting arrest is a versatile tool in the hands of an
enterprising police officer. The charge is easy to levy by police officers, as it
relies on a subjective determination of whether a suspect's bodily
movements are in opposition to the arrest or merely the expected twitches
and re-positionings of a body under restraint.' Even when the underlying
offense is unclear or dismissed, resisting arrest charges may be levied
against the criminal defendant.2 However, scrutiny is occasionally applied
against the charge, with surprising results. For example, in 2009, a Florida
court threw out more than a dozen resisting arrest charges in separate cases,
citing "overreaction" by police officers and poor training regarding citizens'
rights.3 More recently, the U.S. Department of Justice released a scathing
report of police practices in Ferguson, Missouri, noting that officers
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF HAMLET, PRINCE OF DENMARK, act 1, sc.
4 ("Unhand me gentlemen. By heaven I will make a ghost of him that lets me!").
** Member, McAngus Goudelock and Courie, LLP.
1. See Monica Potts, What Policing Looks Like to a Former Investigator of
Misconduct, NPR: CODE SWITCH (Aug. 13, 2014, 11:27 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/codeswitch/2014/08/13/340076968/what-policing-looks-like-to-a-
former-investigator-of-misconduct.
2. See, e.g., Martin Kaste, Arrested for Resisting Arrest-Yes, It's Possible, NPR (Jan.
29, 2015, 9:07 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2015/01/29/382497080/arrested-
for-resisting-arrest-yes-its-possible ("If you continue with this, I will arrest you for resisting
arrest.").
3. See cf Officers Abusing the Charge of "Resisting Arrest" in Florida, OCALA POST
(May 16, 2014), http://www.ocalapost.com/officers-abusing-charge-resisting-arrest/
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[e]xpect and demand compliance even when they lack legal
authority. They are inclined to interpret the exercise of free speech
rights as unlawful disobedience, innocent movements as physical
threats, indications of . .. physical illness as belligerence.4
The rise of social media has accelerated public scrutiny over police
conduct, with videos on sites such as YouTube showing unlawful arrests by
officers and violent reactions in the face of justifiable protests.5 All of which
begs the question when can a citizen say "no" and actively resist an arrest?
For most of our nation's history, the answer has been "whenever the arrest is
unlawful" an unlawful arrest6 was simply treated as any other species of
assault or battery. This deeply rooted common law right was repeatedly
affirmed in English law and imported to the States, but its recognition began
to seriously decline during the tumult of the 1960s and '70s.7 Today only
fourteen states, including South Carolina, continue to expressly recognize a
citizen's right to resist.8
This Comment briefly surveys the common law origins of this long-held
privilege and then turns to an examination of South Carolina law governing
its continued viability and application. The discussion continues with an
exploration of some of the common criticisms of the doctrine and concludes
with an overview of the doctrine's enduring importance in American law.
(acknowledging that resisting arrest charges stem from officers' misunderstanding of the law
and are often thrown out before reaching trial).
4. CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF THE FERGUSON
POLICE DEPARTMENT 2 (2015), https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/opa/press-
releases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police department report.pdf.
5. See, e.g., Josh Kovner, Russell Blair, Vinny Vella & Dave Altimari, Police Face
Scrutiny in Real Time, HARTFORD COURANT (July 10, 2016, 6:56 AM),
http://www.courant.com/news/connecticut/hc-dallas-shootings-police-recruits-0710-20160709
-story.html.
6. The United States Supreme Court has defined an "arrest" as the taking of a person
into custody against her will for purposes of criminal prosecution or interrogation. See
Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979). In South Carolina, an arrest is not
accomplished until an officer makes physical contact with the suspect incident to the arrest, or
the suspect yields to an outward display of the officer's authority such as the declaration "Stop,
Police!" See State v. Bannon, 379 S.C. 487, 503, 666 S.E.2d 272, 280 (Ct. App. 2008).
7. See James Engel, Criminal Law-The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest in Modern
Society, 18 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 107, 109-10 (1984).
8. See discussion infra pp. 8-9.
248 [VOL. 6 9: 247
2
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 1 [2017], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol69/iss1/8
"UNHAND ME, GENTLEMEN!"
I. A PRACTICAL CAUTION
But first, a word of warning. Resisting arrest is a terrible idea and is
never recommended even in the face of egregiously wrongful arrests. The
police are almost guaranteed to win any encounter with a citizen by dint of
numbers, technology, and resources. There are a lot of cops-over 11,000
sworn officers in South Carolina alone, according to the latest U.S.
Department of Justice statistics.9 They will respond rapidly and in force to
aid a fellow officer. They have customized high-performance vehicles,'0
aerial and space-based surveillance," and increasing stockpiles of surplus
military equipment.1 By training and instinct, police will escalate force in
any encounter until control is achieved, and they take a dim view of
challenges to their authority.'3 Former Los Angeles Police Department
officer Sunil Dutta presented this perspective frankly in a Washington Post
op-ed:
[H]ere is the bottom line: if you don't want to get shot, tased,
pepper-sprayed, struck with a baton or thrown to the ground, just do
what I tell you. Don't argue with me, don't call me names, don't tell
9. BRIAN REAVES, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CENSUS OF STATE AND LOCAL LAW
ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, 2008 at app. tbl. 6 (2011), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
cslleaO8.pdf.
10. See, e.g., 2017 Ford Police Interceptor, FORD,
http://www.ford.com/fordpoliceinterceptor/features/#/performance/ (last visited Aug. 25,
2017) (describing available 365 horsepower V-8 engine and sport-tuned suspension on Ford
Interceptor cruisers).
11. See Patrick Korody, Note, Satellite Surveillance Within U.S. Borders, 65 OHIO ST.
L.J. 1627, 1629 (2004); see also Matthew Feeney, Surveillance Takes Wing: Privacy in the
Age ofPolice Drones, CATO INST. (Dec. 13, 2016), https://www.cato.org/publications/policy-
analysis/surveillance-takes-wing-privacy-age-police-drones (noting that law enforcement is
increasingly using drones).
12. Adam Andrzejewski, War Weapons for America's Police Departments: New Data
Shows Feds Transfer $2.2B in Military Gear, FORBES (May 10, 2016, 9:56 PM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/adamandrzejewski/2016/05/10,/war-weapons-for-americas-local-
police-departments/#70efb8e554fe; see Ryan Welch & Jack Mewhirter, Does Military
Equipment Lead Police Officers to Be More Violent? We Did the Research, WASH. POST (June
30, 2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/monkey-cage/wp/2017/06/30/does-military-
equipment-lead-police-officers-to-be-more-violent-we-did-the-research/?utmterm=.b8a6c76c
f27b (explaining that law enforcement agencies began receiving more surplus military
equipment post-9/11).
13. See Kaste, supra note 2 ("There is this-it's not necessarily an evil mentality but
it is a mentality that, 'I am in charge, and you shall not contradict me, you're going to do what
I say, at all costs'. . . . And if you don't do what they say, well now all of a sudden you're a
bad person and they've got to arrest you for that.").
2017] 249
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me that I can't stop you .... Most field stops are complete in
minutes. How difficult is it to cooperate for that long?14
Even when resistance is nonviolent but simply loud and insistent,
tragedy can result. A notorious example is the choking death of Eric Garner,
a New York man who protested police inquiry into his alleged sale of loose
cigarettes by yelling "I'm minding my business" and "I'm tired of it. It stops
today!"'5 New York police officer Daniel Pantaleo responded by sneaking
behind Gamer and placing him in a chokehold,16 a tactic that was barred by
the police department in 1993.'1 Mr. Gamer, an asthmatic, collapsed to the
ground under the hold and died on the scene.'" Video taken by bystanders
chronicles the tragic encounter,'9 and the New York medical examiner ruled
Mr. Gamer's death a homicide.20
So resistance may, indeed, be futile at the scene of the arrest.
Nonetheless, because "the right to be let alone [is] ... the right most valued
by civilized men," opportunities to present the defense will continue.21
Indeed, in light of the current political climate, the opportunities may only
grow.
II. AN ANCIENT PRIVILEGE
As long as there have been armed men with the power to arrest, there
have been angry citizens hell-bent on resistance. The Biblical figure Samson
14. Sunil Dutta, I'm a Cop. If You Don't Want to Get Hurt, Don't Challenge Me, WASH.
POST (Aug. 19, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2014/
08/19/im-a-cop-if-you-dont-want-to-get-hurt-dont-challenge-me/?utmterm=.fba66c28b8 10.
15. Crimesider Staff, "Modified Duty "for Medics After Fatal NYC Arrest, CBS NEWS:
CRIMESIDER (July 21, 2014, 10:55 AM), https://www.cbsnews.com/news/modified-duty-for-
medics-after-fatal-new-york-city-arrest/.
16. Barry Paddock, Rocco Parascandola & Corky Siemaszko, Eric Garner's Death




18. Medical Examiner Rules Eric Garner's Death a Homicide, Says He Was Killed by
Chokehold, NBC N.Y. (Aug. 21, 2014, 7:20 AM), https://www.nbcnewyork.com/
news/local/Eric-Garner-Chokehold-Police-Custody-Cause-of-Death-Staten-Island-Medical-Ex
aminer-26939615 1.html.
19. At the time of this writing, video of the Garner encounter was available from New
York Daily News. See N.Y. Daily News, Eric Garner Video - Unedited Version, YouTUBE
(July 12, 2015), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=JpGxagKOkv8.
20. Paddock, supra note 16.
21. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting),
overruled by Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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was said to have slain 1,000 Philistines who attempted to arrest him for a
host of alleged crimes, including arson and murder.22 In 1215, similarly
agitated English lords forced the imperious King John to sign the Magna
Carta, which provided "[n]o free man shall be seized or
imprisoned ... except by the lawful judgment of his equals or by the law of
the land."23 English courts gave this guarantee teeth by rejecting murder
charges against citizens detained after resisting an unlawful arrest, even if
the arrest was unlawful on purely technical grounds.24 For example, in Sir
Henry Ferrer's Case, a bailiff attempted to arrest Sir Ferrer for a debt.25
Ferrer's servant attacked and killed the officer, and Ferrer was charged with
aiding and abetting a murder.26 The court acquitted Ferrer of murder,
holding that the warrant for Ferrer's arrest was defective-it read "Sir Henry
Ferrers, Knight," when it should have read "Sir Henry Ferrers, Baronet."27
Therefore, the bailiff was a mere "trespasser," and no murder could have
occurred.28
The clearest expression of the early common law right to resist occurred
in Queen v. Tooley.29 In Tooley, a constable arrested Ms. Anne Dekins for
disorderly conduct but without a warrant.30 A group of men saw the arrest
and approached the constable with drawn swords, which prompted him to
"shew[] his constable's staff, and declare[] he was about the Queen's
Business."3' The assailants did not much care, and when the constable called
another officer over to aid him, the men killed that officer.32 They were
charged with murder, but the Queen's Bench rejected the charge and held
"where the liberty of the subject is invaded, it is a provocation to all the
subjects of England."33 Thus, any person who unlawfully arrests another "is
an offender against [Magna Carta]" and can be resisted as a "tyrant." 34
22. Judges 14:19-15:16 (King James).
23. See Homer D. Crotty, Magna Carta: Myth and Reality, 40 L.A. B. BULL. 366, 368,
402 (1965).
24. See Sir Henry Ferrers's Case (1634) 79 Eng. Rep. 924, 924; Cro. Car. 371, 372
(K.B.).




29. The Queen v. Tooley (1710) 92 Eng. Rep. 349, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296 (K.B.).
30. Id. at 349-50, 2 Ld. Raym. at 1296-97.
31. Id. at 350, 2 Ld. Raym. at 1297.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 352, 2 Ld. Raym. at 1301.
34. Id. at 353, 2 Ld. Raym. at 1302. While Tooley involved third-parties opposing the
arrest of another, English courts logically extended the defense to first-party arrests. See, e.g.,
2017] 251
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III. AN ENDURING, BUT QUALIFIED, RIGHT
The right to resist the "tyranny" of unlawful arrest passed with the rest
of English common law to the United States.3 5 The United States Supreme
Court endorsed the principle in Bad Elk v. United States,36 and scores of
state court decisions concurred.37 Perhaps nowhere was the principle
expressed more forcefully than in South Carolina.38 In State v. Bethune, the
court held a citizen may "resist an unlawful arrest, even to the extent of
taking the life of the aggressor, if it be necessary, in order to regain his
liberty." 39
A subsequent case, State v. Francis, reaffirmed this right while refining
the standard for the use of deadly force.40 In Francis, the court quoted
secondary authority for the proposition that an arrestee "may resist force
with force, but he is not authorized to go beyond the line of force
proportioned to the character of the assault."4' This language appeared to
erode Bethune's warrant for the use of deadly force to simply effect an
escape. However, the court did not return to a limited expression of the
doctrine for nearly a century.42
State v. Jackson involved a police officer who went to the home of a
suspect late at night to investigate an unpaid cab fare.43 The suspect claimed
King v. Curvan (1826) 1 Mood. 132, 132-34, 168 Eng. Rep. 1213 (K.B.) (noting an acquittal
of a man accused of assaulting a constable after being charged with insulting another).
35. See Paul G. Chevigny, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest, 78 YALE L.J. 1128,
1131 (1969).
36. 177 U.S. 529, 534 (1900).
37. See, e.g., Chevigny, supra note 35. After Bad Elk, the U.S. Supreme Court never
again addressed the right to resist directly but continued to mention the right in dicta. See
United States v. Di Re, 332 U.S. 581, 594 (1948) ("One has an undoubted right to resist an
unlawful arrest, and courts will uphold the right of resistance in proper cases."); cf
Wainwright v. New Orleans, 392 U.S. 598, 615 (1968) (Justice Douglas dissenting from the
Court's decision to dismiss writ of certiorari as improvidently granted and opining the Court's
refusal to directly address the right to resist suggests the Court "[has] forsaken the Western
tradition and taken a long step toward the oppressive police practices not only of Communist
regimes but of modern Iran, 'democratic' Formosa, and Franco Spain").
38. James B. Lindsey, The Right to Resist an Unlawful Arrest: Judicial and Legislative
Overreaction?, 10 AKRON L. REV. 171, 174 (1976) ("Of particular note in [South Carolina] is
the fact that the right is not conditioned or qualified on any danger to the arrestee's life, but
rather the right is given when it is necessary for the arrestee to free himself from the illegal
custody.")
39. State v. Bethune, 112 S.C. 100, 99 S.E. 753, 754 (1919).
40. State v. Francis, 152 S.C. 17, 149 S.E. 348, 355 (1929).
41. Id., 149 S.E. at 356 (quoting 2 A. & E. Enc. ofLaw, 909).
42. State v. McGowan, 347 S.C. 618, 622-24, 557 S.E.2d 657, 659-60 (2001).
43. State v. Jackson, 227 S.C. 271, 274, 87 S.E.2d 681, 682 (1955).
252 [VOL. 6 9: 247
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he was startled awake by a commotion near his front door.44 When he went
to investigate, someone within the house shined a flashlight into his face,
blinding him.45 The suspect was armed with a pistol and opened fire; only
then did he observe that the wielder of the flashlight was a police officer.46
A conviction for murder followed but was set aside on appeal by the South
Carolina Supreme Court.47 The court's decision was based primarily on the
trial court's failure to charge self-defense, but the court separately affirmed
the common law right to resist arrest with deadly force.48 The court took
care to note that the right extends "to [the] use [of] so much force as
apparently necessary to accomplish [the detainee's] deliverance and no
more."49 After Jackson, the court maintained its emphasis on the
"deliverance" rationale and neglected the "proportionate force" rule of
Francis.50
In State v. McGowan, the court sidestepped Jackson through the
expedient of ignoring the case.5 ' McGowan involved the nearly comical
scenario of a miscreant who called the police to file a false report against
another, only to find himself on the wrong side of the law.52 When an officer
arrived, and things did not go as the arrestee had planned, he brandished a
pistol only to be disarmed.53 Undeterred, he allegedly began "ranting and
raving," which prompted an attempted arrest for disorderly conduct.54 The
arrestee fled toward his house, was caught by his ponytail at the front door,
and began to scuffle with the officer.5 5 Breaking free, he retrieved a shotgun
from his bedroom; the officer fired a "warning shot"; the arrestee returned
fire but somehow missed with his shotgun blast; and finally, the officer fired
again, hitting McGowan in the hand and concluding the fracas.56
McGowan was convicted of assault and battery with intent to kill
(ABIK) and appealed on the ground that the underlying arrest was unlawful;
44. Id. at 275, 87 S.E.2d at 683.
45. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 272, 279, 87 S.E.2d at 685.
48. Id. at 278-79, 87 S.E.2d at 684-85.
49. Id at 277 (emphasis added).
50. See, e.g., State v. Poinsett, 250 S.C. 293, 297, 157 S.E.2d 570, 571 (1967) (noting
that the defendant's right to resist arrest depended on whether the attempted arrest was
unlawful).
51. State v. McGowan, 347 S.C. 618, 557 S.E.2d 657 (2001).
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thus, he had every right to use deadly force to effect his escape.7 The court
rejected the defense wholesale: Not every wrongful arrest can give license to
a deadly struggle.58 Dispensing with citation to Jackson or its progeny, the
court opined that "[c]learly, Bethune and Francis stand for the proposition
that a defendant has the right to resist an arrest to the point of deadly force
only if necessary, and may not use force disproportionate to the injury
threatened."59 Therefore, the charge of ABIK was properly submitted to the
jury.60
It is difficult to credit the court's citation to Bethune in support of the
proportionality doctrine. It has been cited as an example of the deadly force
prerogative for decades, and its facts involve a quintessentially
disproportionate use of force: The decedent was killed after commanding a
defendant to stay in his carriage.6' Nonetheless, the court's citation to
Francis was sound, and the doctrine of proportionality is the current law of
the State of South Carolina.62
IV. A DANGEROUS PREROGATIVE?
South Carolina's preservation of the right to resist is a substantial
departure from the twentieth century trend.63 This trend began in the 1940s
following publication of the Uniform Penal Act, which condemned the use
of any form of force to resist an arresting officer "regardless of whether or
not there is a legal basis for the arrest."64 The 1960s saw a steady erosion of
the right, beginning judicially with the New Jersey Supreme Court's
decision in State v. Koonce.65 Koonce established the template for modem
critics of the doctrine: Resistance would frequently "escalate into
57. Id.
58. Id. at 621-22, 557 S.E.2d at 659.
59. Id. at 624, 557 S.E.2d at 660.
60. Id. at 622, 557 S.E.2d at 659.
61. State v. Bethune, 112 S.C. 100, 99 S.E. 753, 754 (1919); Informal Opinion from
S.C. Atty. Gen. to Capt. Mark Keel (Aug. 23, 1996); see Lindsey, supra note 38 (citing
Bethune when explaining that South Carolina came very close to recognizing the right to resist
as an absolute right).
62. McGowan has since been cited for the proposition that South Carolina recognizes a
charge of assault and battery against a police officer who has conducted an unlawful arrest,
even if the officer did not use excessive force. Horton v. City of Columbia, No. 2014-UP-491,
2014 WL 10009645, at *3 (S.C. Ct. App. Feb. 26, 2014) (citing State v. McGowan, 347 S.C.
618, 623, 556 S.E.2d 657, 660 (2001)).
63. Craig Hemmens & Daniel Levin, Not a Law at All: A Call for a Return to the
Common Law Right to Resist Unlawful Arrest, 29 Sw. L. REV. 1, 6 (1999).
64. Sam Bass Warner, The Uniform Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 345 (1942).
65. State v. Koonce, 214 A.2d 428, 436 (N.J. App. Div. 1965).
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bloodshed"; the modem era of "constantly expanding legal protections"
would provide adequate relief to the aggrieved; and police officers should be
free from the specter of physical harm while performing their duties in good
faith.66
Most of the Southern states, and a few in the Northeast and West,
resisted the trend.67 Today, the right to resist endures in fourteen states:
South Carolina, Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan,68
Mississippi, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Pennsylvania,
Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming.69 In Indiana, a form of the right was
recently legislatively resurrected by the passage of a bill which gives citizens
the right to resist the use of "unlawful force" by the police or any
unauthorized entry into a citizen's home or vehicle.70
Preservation of the common law right has not gone unlamented. In the
Criminal Law ofSouth Carolina, Professor William McAninch and the other
co-authors declare the right to resist with deadly force "an unfortunate
66. Id. at 436.
67. See Hemmens & Levin, supra note 63, at 24.
68. The Michigan Supreme Court revived the right judicially by overruling precedent
that had interpreted a Michigan statute as abrogating the common law. People v. Moreno, 814
N.W.2d 624, 629 (2012).
69. ALA. CODE § 13A-3-28 (LexisNexis 2005); Ex parte Wallace, 497 So. 2d 96, 97
(Ala. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-10-24 (2007); Long v. State, 583 S.E.2d 158, 160 (Ga. Ct.
App. 2003); LA. STAT. ANN. § 14:108 (2004 & Supp. 2010); State v. Ceaser, 2002-3021 (La.
10/21/03); 859 So. 2d 639, 643 (citing City of Monroe v. Goldston, 95-0135 (La. 9/29/96), 661
So.2d 428); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 9-408(b) (LexisNexis 2002 & Supp. 2010); Lamb
v. State, 786 A.2d 783, 800-01 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2001); Chambers v. State, 973 So. 2d 266,
271 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007) (quoting Brendle v. City of Houston, 759 So.2d 1274, 1284 (Miss
Ct. App. 2000)); State v. Phillips, 203 P.3d 146, 149-50 (N.M. Ct. App. 2008); People v.
Jensen, 654 N.E.2d 1237, 1240 (N.Y. 1995); Commonwealth v. Jackson, 924 A.2d 618, 620
(Pa. 2007) (citing Commonwealth v. Biagini, 540 Pa. 22, 32, 655 A.2d 492, 497 (1995)); State
v. McGowan, 347 S.C. 618, 624, 557 S.E.2d 657, 661 (2001); Messier v. Commonwealth, No.
1956-06-2, 2007 Va. App. LEXIS201, *2 (Va. Ct. App. May 15, 2007); State v. Mullins, 62
S.E.2d 562, 564-65 (W. Va. 1950); Mickelson v. State, 906 P.2d 1020, 1023 (Wyo. 1995)
(quoting WYo. STAT. § 6-5-204(a)-(b)); Van Horn v. State, 802 P.2d 883, 885 (Wyo. 1990)
(quoting WYo. STAT. § 6-5-204(a)-(b)). Two states' laws, Ohio and Vermont, are ambiguous.
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2921.33 (LexisNexis 2010); City of Columbus v. Fraley, 324 N.E.2d
736, 739-40 (Ohio 1975); State v. Durham, 2007-Ohio-6262, ¶ 12 (citing OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. 2903.13(A), (C)(3)); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 3017 (2009); State v. Peters, 450 A.2d
332, 335 (Vt. 1982).
70. IND. CODE § 35-41-3-2(i)(1)-(2) provides that a person is privileged to use
reasonable force if he reasonably believes that the force is necessary to protect himself from
the imminent use of unlawful force by police; prevent unlawful entry into his home or vehicle
by police; or terminate unlawful entry of his home or vehicle by police. The Preamble to the
Act declares that "it is the policy of this state that people have a right to defend themselves and
third parties from physical harm and crime."
2017] 255
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doctrine."7 ' The authors further criticize the use of non-deadly force to
resist, echoing Koonce, by opining it is "most predictable" that "any time" a
police officer is resisted during an arrest "someone, perhaps even an
innocent bystander, will be seriously injured or killed." 72 In light of these
odds, the citizen must bear the "indignity and loss of freedom entailed in an
unlawful arrest" and wait for a judicial resolution.73
This criticism adopts the perspective of institutional authority as the
default perspective from which to view individual rights. Its technical
defects betray this institutional bias. For example, the right to resist with
deadly force is limited by McGowan to those circumstances when a
proportionate harm would be threatened, as when necessary to defend life. 74
The expression of this natural instinct for self-preservation in the face of
unlawful and life-threatening conduct is difficult to reckon as categorically
"unfortunate."
Further, there is not a necessary connection between a resisting arrest
charge and violence. South Carolina has not clearly defined the parameters
of "resisting," but other states have rendered the definition so broad as to
encompass most nonviolent protests.7 5 New York defines resistance as any
intentional act that prevents, or attempts to prevent, a police officer from
effecting an arrest.76 California permits charges against one who resists or
"delays" a police officer in making an arrest.77 North Carolina adopts the
same approach.7 1 Mississippi broadly authorizes the charge against anyone
who resists by force "or in any other manner."79 Florida has expressly
adopted the charge of "resisting arrest without violence," which permits
detention of anyone who merely "opposes" the officer. 80
Even if resistance must be "physical" to warrant a resisting charge, it
need not be "violent."" The instinctive retreat by a protestor who is grabbed
from behind; the shifting of a body under the knee of an official; or the
71. LESLEY M. COGGIOLA ET AL., THE CRIMINAL LAW OF SOUTH CAROLINA 645 (6th
ed. 2013).
72. Id. at 646.
73. Id.
74. State v. McGowan, 347 S.C. 618, 624, 557 S.E.2d 657, 660 (2001).
75. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 148(a)(1) (West 2016); FLA. STAT. § 843.02 (West
2014); MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-9-73 (Rev. 2014); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-223 (2016); N.Y.
PENAL LAW § 205.30 (McKinney 2010).
76. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 205.30 (McKinney 2010).
77. CAL. PENAL CODE § 148(a)(1).
78. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-223.
79. MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-9-73.
80. FLA. STAT. § 843.02.
81. See Potts, supra note 1.
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sluggishness of a citizen in medical distress may all be interpreted as
"resistance."8 2
The expansion of resisting arrest charge rationales is unsurprising. As
institutional authority over the person grows, it seeks to expand in a
predictable sequence. Bureaucratic organizations, such as police
departments, metropolitan administrations, and the special interest groups
that advance their causes, may seek to dispense with consideration of
individual circumstances in favor of broad, institutionally favorable, and
impersonal rules.3 Simultaneously, many citizens who see themselves as
unaffected by the encroachment of authority such as those who do not
inhabit the poor neighborhoods or demographic niches that often attract
police activity are initially indifferent to the encroachment, or even
receptive to its promise of easing the uncertainty of rights-based rule.84
Taken to its extreme, the march toward unchallenged institutional authority
may begin to characterize resistance to arrest as not only a criminal offense
but a crime of moral turpitude. Such a sentiment has been expressed by
Louisiana Police Chief Calder Herbert, who advocates charging resisting
citizens with a felony hate crime under Louisiana's "Blue Lives Matter"
law.85
Police advocates are undeterred by these considerations. They counter
that harsher penalties for resistance are necessary to combat disorder.8 6
Unfortunately, the resort to harsh penalties badly misunderstands the
82. Journalist Monica Potts, who served on a civilian review board investigating
complaints against N.Y.P.D. officers, reports that resisting arrest was one of an array of
charges that investigators colloquially referred to as "P.O.P.: Pissing Off Police." Id.
83. The tendency of bureaucracies to expand their sphere of influence has received
much comment. A general discussion of the issue can be found in the works of famed
sociologist Max Weber, particularly The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism. There,
Weber discusses the metaphorical "iron cage" of bureaucracy that expands impersonal and
procedurally rational goals while shrinking the sphere of "substantive rationality" that informs
traditional values. See generally MAX WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF
CAPITALISM 182 (T. Parsons trans.) (Routledge 2005).
84. For a book-length discussion of the discomforting psychological dissonance that can
accompany a citizen's freedom to choose between competing societal interests, see ERICH
FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM (Holt 1st paperback ed. 1994).
85. See Jacob Sugarman, Resisting Arrest Can Now be Considered a Hate Crime in
Louisiana, SALON (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.salon.com/2017/01/26/resisting-arrest-can-
now-be-considered-a-hate-crime-in-louisianapartner/. In the face of media criticism and
disagreement from the Louisiana Governor's Office, Calder later issued a "clarification" of his
original position. See Valerie Ponseti, Chief Clarifies Use of Hate Crime Law, KATC (Jan. 26,
2017), http://www.katc.com/story/34310586/st-martinville-police-hope-change-comes-with-
states-new-hate-crime-law. However, the clarification merely provided that each officer may
apply the laws of the state "under their understanding and discretion in the field." Id.
86. See discussion supra note 84.
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relevant dynamic. First, the doctrine is fundamentally post factum.
Consideration of its use will not typically arise until a post-arrest interview
between lawyer and client in which the lawyer explains the parameters of a
viable defense.7 In this light, the doctrine is simply another species of
affirmative defense that protects vested public rights, such as the common
law right to lawfully resist warrantless entry into the home." Rampant
disorder is an unlikely (and nowhere empirically supported) outcome of
criminal process.
Second, resisting arrest is overwhelmingly a "spontaneous act," not a
calculated crime.8 9 Citizens faced with unlawful detention do not
dispassionately weigh the costs of resistance; they resist because the affront
to their liberty arouses an instinct of self-defense against arbitrary power.
Post-hoc governmental penalties will have a poor deterrent effect against
this defensive instinct.90 "In its immediate and most essential form, self-
defense is not something government can really stop."9 1
On a more fundamental level, the public order objection simply
misunderstands the type of order a free society should prefer. Lawful
resistance can occur only after public order has already been disturbed by
the unlawful arrest itself. 92 Invasion of the citizen's right to "possession and
control of his own person, free from all restraint or interference of others,
unless by clear and unquestionable authority of law" is quintessentially
disordered.93 Thus, categorically suppressing the right may certainly lead to
a kind of order, but it is the order of the throne room. In a nation committed
to constitutional order, certain methods of control are simply taken off the
table in deference to a free society. 94
87. See Chevigny, supra note 35, at 1133-34.
88. Regarding the right to resist warrantless entry into the home, see generally
Investigation and Police Practices, 35 GEO. L.J. ANN. REV. CRIM. PROC. 3, 80 (2006).
89. People v. Cherry, 121 N.E.2d 238, 239-40 (1954) ("[A]n illegal arrest is an
outrageous affront ... resisted as energetically as a violent assault . . . .").
90. Bruce Kaufman, Emotional Arousal as a Source of Bounded Rationality, 38 J.
ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 135, 135-44 (1998).
91. Nicholas J. Johnson, Self Defense?, 2 J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 187, 194 (2006). Self-
defense is used in this context as the instinctual response to aggression or restraint, and does
not refer to the technical legal defense. State v. Bethune, 112 S.C. 100, 99 S.E. 753 (1919),
distinguished the legal doctrines of self-defense and resistance to unlawful arrest.
92. A famous rebuttal to a plea for passivity in the face of injustice reminds critics to
avoid "the superficial kind of social analysis that deals merely with effects and does not
grapple with underlying causes." JONATHAN RIEDER, GOSPEL OF FREEDOM: MARTIN LUTHER
KING JR.'S LETTER FROM BIRMINGHAM JAIL AND THE STRUGGLE THAT CHANGED A NATION
171 (2013).
93. Union Pac. Ry. Co. v. Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251 (1891).
94. District of Columbia v. Heller, 544 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
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The tension between personal freedom and order was discussed by the
United States Supreme Court in District of Columbia v. Heller.95 Heller
addressed the perennial debate over gun control in the United States.96
Petitioner Heller applied for a handgun registration certificate in the District,
which was refused.97 The District generally banned the possession of
handguns, and long-guns were required to be stored unassembled or with a
trigger-lock. 98
The Court struck down the District's gun-control measures with an
opinion steeped in the rhetoric of self-defense.99 The natural right of self-
defense is properly understood as "the predecessor of our Second
Amendment."'o At the time of the Founding, Americans understood the
"right of self-preservation" as permitting a citizen to "repe[l] force by force"
when "the intervention of society in his behalf, may be too late to prevent an
injury."' This included injury by the government, as the right was
necessarily invoked against the predations of English Rule.102
If taken seriously, Heller may give proponents of the right to resist a
new and powerful constitutional weapon. Unlike a common law right, which
can be modified or altogether legislated out of existence, a constitutional
prerogative is comparatively inveterate. It is a short step from Heller to
conclude that the right to resist arrest is indeed such a right, given its shared
origin with the Second Amendment's "self-preservation" rationale. Of
course, the ink on Heller is barely dry in jurisprudential terms, so for now
the constitutional status of the right to resist must wait for its day in court.
V. AN OUTDATED CONCEPT?
In the meantime, law and order advocates will continue to bewail the
doctrine. One of their most often cited arguments is that the common law
95. Id
96. See id. at 573-636.
97. Id at 575.
98. Id at 576, 628.
99. Id. at 636.
100. Id at 593.
101. Id at 594-95 (quoting 1 J. BLACKSTONE'S COMMENTARIES 145-46 n.42 (1803)).
102. Id. at 593; see Don B. Kates, Jr., The Second Amendment and the Ideology of Self-
Protection, 9 CONST. COMMENT 87, 93 (1992) ("Whether murder, rape, and theft be
committed by gangs of assassins, tyrannous officials and judges or pillaging soldiery was a
mere detail.. .. ").
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right is hopelessly outmoded in the modem age.'03 After all, modem
America is not eighteenth-century England, where custodial conditions were
potentially deadly:
[P]risoners were often kept in irons. Those without the means to
buy better accommodations were frequently huddled together in
dark, filthy rooms. . . . Under such conditions, imprisonment until
the next term of court was often equivalent to a death sentence,
especially during the frequent periods when prisons were swept by a
malignant form of typhus known as "gaol fever."10 4
Furthermore, the modem judicial system grants fundamental due
process protections to those wrongfully detained: probable cause hearings,
access to counsel, reasonable bail, and civil remedies against government
agents are all available to the modem detainee. o
It is certainly undeniable that conditions for the detained have
dramatically improved. But this argument is a strawman; the conditions
existing in eighteenth-century England were not the origin of the doctrine.106
The doctrine arose in acknowledgement of the inherent "provocation" of an
unlawful arrest.'0 7 This rationale was repeatedly vindicated by state courts
until very recently in our legal history. In 1954, the New York Supreme
Court opined "an illegal arrest is an outrageous affront . .. to be resisted as
energetically as a violent assault."0 Legal commentators of the last century
shifted focus to prison conditions and modem procedure to obscure or
marginalize the animating principle behind the rule.' 09 However, the
academic tide has begun to turn, with some modem scholars calling for a
return to the common law prerogative. Io
Even with custodial reform, real and serious costs are imposed today
upon those unlawfully detained. An arrest is not a sanguine encounter; it is
often attended by great anxiety, emotional upset, and social stigma.'
103. See, e.g., Kimberly T. Owens, Note, Maryland's Common Law Right to Resist
Unlawful Arrest: Does it Really Exist, 30 U. BALT. L. REV. 213, 220 (2000).
104. Sam B. Warner, Investigating the Law ofArrest, 26 A.B.A.J. 151, 152 (1940).
105. See id. at 226 (citing State v. Hobson, 577 N.W.2d 825, 838 (Wis. 1998)).
106. The Queen v. Tooley (1710) 92 Eng. Rep. 349, 2 Ld. Raym. 1296 (K.B.).
107. Id.
108. People v. Cherry, 121 N.E.2d 238, 239-40 (1954).
109. See, e.g., Hemmens & Levin, supra note 63 (citing Sam B. Warner, The Uniform
Arrest Act, 28 VA. L. REV. 315, 331 (1941-1942)).
110. Id at 7.
111. See Robert I. Simon, The Psychological and Legal Aftermath of False Arrest and
Imprisonment, 21 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY L. 523, 525-27 (1993).
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Anxiety may be most acute for those who do not share the established view
about the safety of police custody. The widely-reported death of Freddie
Gray in 2015 heightened these concerns for many.112 The Baltimore police
arrested Mr. Gray for possessing a switchblade knife and then handcuffed
and placed him inside a police van." 3 During his transport to the police
station, he suffered a severe spinal cord injury that led to his death.114 The
medical examiner's office ruled the death a homicide, " 5 and the officers
involved in the transport were charged with crimes ranging from illegal
arrest to "depraved heart murder." 116 Riots broke out in Baltimore after
Gray's death, " 7 and the failure of the prosecutor's office to secure
convictions against the officers fueled allegations that the Baltimore police
are effectively immune from criminal liability. 118
Procedural reforms have also failed to provide a panacea. Probable
cause hearings are not immediate, and detainees in some jurisdictions can
find themselves in jail for days before facing a judge. 119 During that time,
work shifts are missed, childcare costs accrue, and vehicle impound fees
mount.120 For the poor, these costs can wreak havoc on their ability to
provide for themselves and their families.121 Multiple court dates are often
112. Andrea K. McDaniels, Civil Unrest Related to Freddie Gray Death Caused
Depressive Symptoms, BALT. SUN (July 20, 2017, 4:00 PM), http://www.baltimore
sun.com/health/bs-hs-stress-freddie-gray-20 17 720-story.html.
113. Peter Hermann & John Woodrow Cox, A Freddie Gray Primer, WASH. POST (Apr.
28, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/local/wp/2015/04/28/a-freddie-gray-primer-
who-was-he-how-did-he-why-is-there-so-much-anger/?utmterm=.71aa2596e3b3; Brandon
Longo, Timeline: Freddie Gray's Arrest to His Fatal Spinal Cord Injury, CBS BALT. (Jun. 23,
2016), http://baltimore.cbslocal.com/2016/06/23/timeline-freddie-grays-arrest-to-his-fatal-
spinal-cord-injury/.
114. Longo, supra note 113.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Hermann & Cox, supra note 113.
118. See id. For other cases of deaths in police custody, see generally Holly Yan & Sarah
Aarthun, Not Just Freddie Gray: Others Who Died in Police Custody, CNN, http://www.cnn.
com/2015/04/22/us/suspicious-deaths-in-police-custody/index.html (last updated Apr. 22,
2015) (describing the case of Victor White, a Louisiana man who allegedly shot himself in the
chest while in the back of a police cruiser with his hands cuffed behind him).
119. See, e.g., Jones v. Lowndes County, 678 F.3d 344 (5th Cir. 2012) (holding that a
detention of more than forty-eight hours did not violate plaintiffs right to prompt probable
cause hearing).
120. See, e.g., JEAN CHUNG, JUST. POL'Y INST., BAILING ON BALTIMORE: VOICES FROM
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required to resolve the offense, exacerbating the financial burden.122 When
the charge finally draws the full attention of the prosecuting attorney, it is
often simply dropped23  giving the accused a sort of procedural victory,
but a Pyrrhic one at best, as there is no recoupment for the expense and
anxiety suffered through the process.124
The low prosecution rate of resisting arrest charges-in one study, only
4.4% of resisting arrest charges went to trial and garnered convictions125
suggests that in most cases, it is the arresting officer, not the court system,
that imposes the penalty for resisting arrest. The process is the punishment in
such cases, with the ultimate outcome merely incidental to the immediate
costs of detention.126 Of course, officers can be sued civilly for unlawful
arrest, 127 but recovery in such cases is difficult. 128 Officers enjoy the legal
advantage of qualified sovereign immunity and the narrative advantage of
representing the State as its underpaid-yet-dutiful crime fighters. 129
These conditions exist alongside the increased presence of the police in
everyday life. In eighteenth-century England, there was no professional
police force.130 Some cities hired night constables as a deterrent to criminal
122. See Pre-Trial Court Appearances in a Criminal Case, AM. BAR Ass'N,
https://www.americanbar.org/groups/public education/resources/law related education netw
ork/howcourtswork/pretrial appearances.html ( ast visited Sept. 10, 2017).
123. See Philip Messing et al., Only a Fraction of 'Arrest Resistors' Are Prosecuted,
N.Y. POST (Aug. 15, 2014, 1:59 AM), http://nypost.com/2014/08/15/too-few-resisting-arrest-
suspects-are-prosecuted-nypd-official/ (noting only 4.4% of resisting arrest charges result in
convictions and most charges are dropped).
124. See Ira P. Robbins, The Price Is Wrong: Reimbursement of Expenses for Acquitted
Criminal Defendants, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2014).
125. See id.
126. See generally MALCOLM FEELY, THE PROCESS IS THE PUNISHMENT: HANDLING
CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (2nd ed. 1992) (examining the significant costs and
compromises imposed by modern criminal process).
127. See, e.g., Sorrell v. McGuigan, 38 F. App'x 970 (4th Cir. 2002) (holding that police
officer who arrested plaintiff for legally carrying a folding knife was liable for unlawful
arrest).
128. See id. at 972 ("Public officials performing their duties are shielded from liability so
long as their conduct does not breach 'clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of
which a reasonable person would have known."') (quoting Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800,
818 (1982)).
129. See id; see, e.g., Vida B. Johnson, Bias in Blue: Instructing Jurors to Consider the
Testimony of Police Officer Witnesses with Caution, 44 PEPP. L. REV. 245, 294-96 (2017)
(arguing that most jurors "giv[e] undue weight to police officer testimony," especially in
majority white jurisdictions).
130. See Ben Johnson, Sir Robert Peel and His "Bobbies," HISTORIC UK,
http://www.historic-uk.com/HistoryUK/HistoryofEngland/Sir-Robert-Peel/ (last visited Sept.
10, 2017) ("Today it is hard to believe that Britain in the 18th century did not have a
professional police force.").
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conduct,13' but the concept of a heavily-armed, permanent police presence
was unknown.132 Thus, the eighteenth-century citizen simply had less
chance to be detained by errant police activity. While large, professional
police departments have certainly made society safer, their sheer numbers
have also increased the likelihood of encounters that infringe on citizens'
rights. In this environment, a retreat from the common law right of resistance
would appear fundamentally regressive.
VI. CONCLUSION
The common law is the repository of our shared experience.133
Therefore, in its earliest forms, the law provided scant protection against
public or private injury to the person "the king can do no wrong"134 and
"let the buyer beware"135 were doctrines that reflected the hardscrabble
truths of medieval life. As society matured, the law slowly adapted to reflect
the emerging demands of a populace that could not be effectively governed
without concessions to the individual spirit. Thus, sovereign immunity was
abrogated,136 and the courts were compelled to compensate the innocent for
damages arising from negligence and fraud.137 When the medieval veil was
rent entirely by the twin upheavals of the Reformation and the
Enlightenment,138 the concept of individual liberty began a philosophical
ascent that would reach its summit in the American Revolution.139 So, too,
would the common law eventually embrace the idea that the fundamental
rights of the individual were inviolable against unwarranted deprivation,
131. See Crime Justice and Punishment Policing in London, OLD BAILEY ONLINE,
https://www.oldbaileyonline.org/static/Policing.jsp#constablestext (last visited Sept. 10, 2017).
132. See David Friedman, Making Sense of English Law Enforcement in the 18th
Century, DAVIDDFRIEDMAN.COM, http://www.daviddfriedman.com/Academic/England_
18thc./England_ 18thc.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2017) ("England in the 18th century had no
public officials corresponding to either police or district attorneys.").
133. See OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 5 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed.,
Belknap Press 1963) (1881) ("The life of the law has not been logic: It has been experience.").
134. George W. Pugh, Historical Approach to the Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity, 13
LA. L. REV. 476, 476 (1953).
135. Page Keeton, Products Liability Liability Without Fault and the Requirement of a
Defect, 41 TEX. L. REV. 855, 855 (1963) (quoting Chew, The Suing Grows for Products that
Are Faulty, NAT'L OBSERVER, Jan. 14, 1963, at 21).
136. See Johnathan R. Siegel, The Hidden Source of Congress's Power to Abrogate State
Sovereign Immunity, 73 TEX. L. REV. 539, 539 (1995).
137. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
138. See, e.g., The Impact of Enlightenment in Europe, U.S. HIST. ONLINE TEXTBOOK,
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whether by private actors or the State itself. 140 The doctrine of resistance to
unlawful arrest reflects this hard-won consensus. For most of our nation's
existence, this consensus has informed the American identity.
This American identity has historically lauded restraint. Therefore, the
law in most jurisdictions has compelled the person faced with an attack to
retreat when possible in the face of an assault.14' The person dispossessed of
his property has generally been barred from engaging in self-help to re-take
his stolen goods.142 But restraint should not be confused with docility. Those
who seek to abrogate the right to resist ignore the powerful provocation an
unlawful arrest represents to the detainee, who may endure wrongful
accusation, assault and battery,143 incarceration, and economic loss in one
efficient swoop. The provocation is perhaps more acute because it is
triggered by a police officer the very agent charged with the day-to-day
safeguarding of the individual.
The difficulties that police officers encounter in the field have not been
discussed in this Comment, as the point is virtually axiomatic. Police
officers face uncooperative, belligerent, and dangerous actors every day.
They deserve our respect. However, they do not deserve the right to
unlawfully arrest others. The time when officers were hands of the crown,
and presumably faultless when about the King's business, has long passed.
Today, officers are fellow citizens charged with the people's business and
must proceed in respectful relation to the people's rights when executing
their duties. The right to resist unlawful arrest recognizes the appropriate
relationship between the citizen and his agents, and is a welcome heritage
from the common law.
140. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (recognizing a fimdamental right
to control the education of one's child and protecting this right from government interference).
141. The duty to retreat reflects the reality that a private citizen often abandons an assault
once his target has retreated a distance and emotions have cooled. In the case of an unlawful
arrest, retreat is not likely to have the same effect because the officer will feel duty-bound to
complete the arrest once it is commenced.
142. See Symposium, Self-Help Repossession of Consumer Goods: A Constitutional
Look at Section 9-503 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 7 VAL. U. L. REV. 439 (1973).
143. In South Carolina, an unlawful arrest may support a claim for assault and battery
against a police officer. Excessive force is not a necessary component of the assault and
battery charge. See Horton v. City of Columbia, No. 2014-UP-491, 2014 WL 10009645, at *3
(S.C. Ct. App. 2014).
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